Non-cooperative Game For Capacity Offload by Zhang, Feng et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
10
8.
14
56
v1
  [
cs
.N
I] 
 6 
Au
g 2
01
1
Non-cooperative Game For Capacity Offload
Feng Zhang, Wenyi Zhang, Senior Member, IEEE, and Qiang Ling, Senior
Member, IEEE
Abstract
With the blasting increase of wireless data traffic, incumbent wireless service providers (WSPs)
face critical challenges in provisioning spectrum resource. Given the permission of unlicensed access
to TV white spaces, WSPs can alleviate their burden by exploiting the concept of “capacity offload” to
transfer part of their traffic load to unlicensed spectrum. For such use cases, a central problem is for
WSPs to coexist with others, since all of them may access the unlicensed spectrum without coordination
thus interfering each other. Game theory provides tools for predicting the behavior of WSPs, and we
formulate the coexistence problem under the framework of non-cooperative games as a capacity offload
game (COG). We show that a COG always possesses at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE),
and does not have any mixed-strategy NE. The analysis provides a full characterization of the structure
of the NEs in two-player COGs. When the game is played repeatedly and each WSP individually updates
its strategy based on its best-response function, the resulting process forms a best-response dynamic. We
establish that, for two-player COGs, alternating-move best-response dynamics always converge to an NE,
while simultaneous-move best-response dynamics does not always converge to an NE when multiple
NEs exist. When there are more than two players in a COG, if the network configuration satisfies
certain conditions so that the resulting best-response dynamics become linear, both simultaneous-move
and alternating-move best-response dynamics are guaranteed to converge to the unique NE.
Index Terms
best response; capacity offload; Nash equilibrium; non-cooperative game; power allocation; unli-
censed spectrum
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1I. INTRODUCTION
With the blasting increase of wireless data traffic from new applications such as smartphones, a
solution for wireless service providers (WSPs) is to make use of the concept of “capacity offload”
to transfer part of their traffic load elsewhere off the main system, to alleviate the load thus
improving the overall system capacity. In industry, femtocell and WiFi networks are the primary
candidates for capacity offload [1] [2]. As the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and
other regulatory bodies have recently permitted unlicensed access to TV white space spectrum
[3], it becomes possible for WSPs to use dynamic spectrum access techniques to offload their
traffic from their own licensed bands (i.e., private bands) to the publicly available unlicensed
bands (i.e., shared bands). A natural question thus comes to us: what is the impact of the
additional unlicensed spectrum on coexistence? A general drawback associated with unlicensed
spectrum is the so-called tragedy of the commons [4], i.e., the spectrum may be overused by
WSPs without admission fee and the communication may encounter excessive interference [5].
We consider a simplified network model as depicted in Figure 1. Suppose a time-division
channel access scheme, so that in each time slot only one user equipment is active in each
WSP’s network. The WSPs utilize the additional unlicensed spectrum simultaneously, due to
absence of coordination among different WSPs on spectrum allocation. A user equipment can
communicate with its serving WSP in the corresponding private band and the shared band at the
same time. Communication in the private band is free from interference of other WSPs, while
in the shared band, a receiver will experience interferences from other WSPs’ transmissions. A
transmitter has an average power constraint and thus needs to allocate its power budget between
its private band and the shared band. The power allocation strategies of WSPs thus lead to an
inherent interaction among the WSPs, thus determining their behaviors.
Game theory is a powerful tool in analyzing and predicting outcomes of interactive decision
making processes. In this work, we use game theory to analyze the interaction among WSPs,
and formulate such interaction into a capacity offload game (COG): WSPs are players of the
game, power allocation schemes (i.e., how to split each WSP’s power budget between private
band and shared band) constitute the strategy space of each WSP, and achievable rates are the
utility functions of WSPs. Due to the lack of coordination, the relationship among the WSPs is
competitive; that is, a COG is non-cooperative and each WSP would choose a power allocation
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2strategy to attempt to maximize its achievable rate regardless of other WSPs.
There has recently been a heightened interest in the applications of game theory in wireless
networks; see, e.g., [6] and references therein. Works whose models bear similarities to ours,
however, are relatively few, summarized as follows. In [7], the authors considered a network
consisting of two interfering links for which both sources have access to a common relay which
has access to bands orthogonal to that used by the sources. In [8], the authors considered a
network consisting of two source-destination links and three bands, assuming that one of the
bands is shared by the transmitters while the other two bands are private. The analysis therein
is based on results of supermodular games, with strategy spaces defined in a way such that the
game has strategic complementarities. Unfortunately, that approach does not apply for games
with more than two players, as that we consider in this paper.
Through the analysis of the COG, we arrive at a number of interesting conclusions. The COG
always has at least one pure-strategy NE when all WSPs adopt deterministic strategies (i.e.,
pure strategies). When WSPs reach an NE, none of them would have incentive to unilaterally
deviate from the NE since otherwise the deviation would decrease its utility [9]. Even if we
permit mixed strategies, i.e., an WSP choosing its strategy randomly according to a probability
distribution over its strategy space, the COG does not possess any mixed-strategy NE. The NE of
a COG is not necessarily unique, and the number of NEs depends upon the network parameters.
As an illustration, we fully characterize the NEs for two-player COGs, for all possible network
parameters.
We then examine the behavior of best-response learning algorithms [10] which requires only
local information for each WSP, to study how to reach an NE in a distributed way. In best-
response learning algorithms, a COG is played repeatedly and in each time slot, an WSP updates
its strategy based on its best-response function with respect to other WSPs’ strategies in the
previous time slot. WSPs can update their strategies either simultaneously or alternatingly. Our
findings are as follows. For a two-player COG, alternating-move best-response dynamics always
converge to an NE, regardless of the number of NEs in the game; whereas the simultaneous-move
best-response dynamic does not always converge to an NE when multiple NEs exist, depending
upon the initial strategies adopted. For COGs with more than two WSPs, the convergence
property is generally difficult to analyze due to the nonlinearity in the best-response functions.
But we find that when the network parameters are configured in a way such that each WSP’s
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3best-response function is linear with respect to other WSPs’ strategies, both simultaneous-move
and alternating-move best-response dynamics are guaranteed to converge to the unique NE of
the COG.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section II formulates the capacity
offload problem as a non-cooperative game and sets some basic assumptions for analysis. Section
III establishes the existence of pure-strategy NE and the non-existence of mixed-strategy NE for
COGs, and characterizes the structure of the NEs in two-player COGs. Section IV analyzes the
convergence properties of best-response learning algorithms for approaching NEs. Section V
provides numerical results to illustrate the behaviors of learning algorithms. Finally, Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. MODEL AND GAME-THEORETIC CONSIDERATIONS
A. System model
An abstract model for capacity offloading may be described as follows; also see Figure 2.
Assume that a set, K = {1, · · · , K}, of access points from different WSPs are deployed in a
geographic area. Suppose that each WSP, say WSP k, occupies a private band, whose bandwidth
is Bp,k Hertz. A shared band, whose bandwidth is Bs Hertz, can be accessed and made use of
by all WSPs. So the total available bandwidth, B Hertz, consists of all WSP’s private bands and
the shared band; that is, B = (α +
∑
k∈K βk)B Hertz, where α = Bs/B and βk = Bp,k/B, for
k ∈ K.
We assume that the transmitter of WSP k has an average power constraint Pk, and that it can
arbitrarily allocate its power on its own private band and the shared band. Denote by xk ∈ [0, 1]
the fraction of WSP k’s power allocated on its private band; that is, the WSP transmits at power
xkPk in its private band, and at (1 − xk)Pk in the shared band.1 WSPs deploy time-division
channel access scheme, so that in each time slot, a WSP exclusively transmits information to a
single user equipment. All receivers are subject to additive white Gaussian noise with zero mean
and power spectral density n0. We further assume that all the link channels are frequency-flat,
among which |hk,k|2 is the channel gain of the link from WSP k’s transmitter to its corresponding
1It is reasonable for each WSP to use up all its power. If there is power left unallocated for an WSP, it can allocate this
residual power on its private band to increase its achievable rate without creating extra interference to other WSPs.
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4receiver in both its private band and the shared band, and |hj,k|2 is the channel gain of the link
from WSP j’s transmitter to WSP k’s receiver.
The considered frequency-flat fading model is somewhat restrictive in that the channel gains
over the private bands and the share band are set identical. This would occur mainly in situations
where the private bands and the shared band are not far apart in frequency. Using such a simplified
model, however, we are able to convey our key ideas effectively without dwelling in tedious
technicalities. Extensions to more general fading models are possible; see, e.g., [8]. In the sequel,
we use cj,k to replace |hj,k|2/B and ck,k to replace |hk,k|2/B, to simplify notations.
We denote the symbols transmitted by WSP k’s transmitter by sp,k (in its private band) and
ss,k (in the shared band), with time indices suppressed. So the received baseband signals at WSP
k’s receiver can be written as yp,k = hk,ksp,k + zp,k (in its private band) and ys,k = hk,kss,k +∑
j∈K\{k} hj,kss,j + zs,k (in the shared band), where E[|zp,k|2] = n0βiB, E[|zs,k|2] = n0αB,
E[|sp,k|
2] = xkPk and E[|ss,k|2] = (1 − xk)Pk. We consider a naive coding scheme in which
all transmitted symbols follow Gaussian codebooks and all receivers adopt single-user decoding
treating others’ signals as noise. Hence, WSP k’s achievable rate (normalized by B) is:
uk(x) =α log2
(
1 +
(1− xk)Pkck,k
n0α +
∑
j∈K\{k}(1− xj)Pjcj,k
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
in the shared band
+βk log2
(
1 +
xkPkck,k
n0βk
)
(bits/Hertz)︸ ︷︷ ︸
in the private band
,
(1)
where vector x = (x1, · · · , xK)T represents the power allocation strategies adopted by all the
WSPs. Due to the lack of coordination among WSPs, it is reasonable to suppose that each WSP
adopts its individual strategy to attempt to maximize its own achievable rate, regardless of other
WSPs’ rates. This situation is formally described by the COG, introduced in the following.
B. Game-theoretic model
We define the pure-strategy form of COG as G = 〈K, (Xk)k∈K, (uk)k∈K〉, in which K represents
the set of players (i.e., the WSPs), Xk is the set of WSP k’s pure strategies, i.e., the power
allocation ratio xk ∈ [0, 1], and the utility function uk is given by (1). More generally, we
may also consider mixed strategies: each player k ∈ K chooses its strategy xk following a
November 5, 2018 DRAFT
5discrete probability distribution πk(xk) = (πk,x(1)
k
, · · · , π
k,x
(N)
k
)T ∈ ∆(Xk) over a finite strategy
space (where π
k,x
(n)
k
represents the probability that WSP k chooses strategy x(n)k ) or following
a probability distribution function πk(xk) ∈ ∆(Xk) over a continuous strategy space, where∫ 1
0
πk(xk)dxk = 1, πk(xk) ≥ 0. For mixed strategies, the utility function u¯k of player k is defined
as the expectation of uk in (1) with respect to the probability distributions of all players’ strategies.
We can define the mixed strategic-form game for COG as G′ = 〈K, (∆(Xk))k∈K, (u¯k)k∈K〉.
The definitions of pure-strategy and mixed-strategy NEs are as follows [11].
Definition 1 (Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium): A strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1, ..., x∗K)T is a pure-
strategy NE for the COG, if ∀k ∈ K and ∀x′k ∈ Xk, uk(x∗k,x∗−k) ≥ uk(x
′
k,x
∗
−k), where the
subscript −k represents all the players other than player k.
Definition 2 (Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium): A mixed-strategy profile π∗ is a mixed-strategy
NE for the COG, if ∀k ∈ K and ∀π′k ∈ ∆(Xk), u¯k(π∗k, π∗−k) ≥ u¯k(π
′
k, π
∗
−k), where u¯k(π) =
Epi[uk(xk,x−k)] : ∆(X1)× ...×∆(XK) −→ R.
III. ANALYSIS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we establish the existence of pure-strategy NE, as well as the nonexistence
of mixed-strategy NE, for COGs. With the aid of explicit best-response function, we fully
characterize the structure of NEs for two-player COGs, by displaying the relationship between
network parameters and the NEs.
A. Existence of Pure-strategy NE
The existence of pure-strategy NEs for COGs is an application of the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Rosen [12]): At least one NE exists for every concave K-player game.
For a concave game, the joint strategy set is convex, closed and bounded, and for each player
k ∈ K, its utility function is continuous with respect to the joint strategy and is concave with
respect to player k’s strategy. Then we state the existence theorem as follows:
Theorem 1 (Existence of pure-strategy NE): A pure-strategy COG, G = 〈K, (Xk)k∈K, (uk)k∈K〉,
always possesses at least one NE, i.e., there is at least one strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1, · · · , x∗K)T
such that uk(x∗k,x∗−k) ≥ uk(x
′
k,x
∗
−k) holds, ∀k ∈ K, ∀x
′
k ∈ Xk.
Proof: By lemma 1, it suffices to verify that the pure-strategy COG is a concave K-player
game:
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61) The pure-strategy x is from a convex, closed and bounded set, namely X1 × · · · ×XK =
{x = (x1, · · · , xK)|xk ∈ [0, 1], for k = 1, · · · , K};
2) Player k’s utility function, uk(x), defined by (1), is continuous in x and is concave in xk,
since
∂2uk(x)
∂x2k
= −
αP 2k c
2
k,k
[n0α +
∑
j∈K(1− xj)Pjcj,k]
2
−
βkP
2
k c
2
k,k
(n0βk + xkPkck,k)2
< 0.
B. Nonexistence of Mixed-strategy NE
Theorem 1 guarantees that at least one pure-strategy NE exists, but it is remains unclear
whether a mixed-strategy NE exists. In the following, we rule out this possibility.
Theorem 2 (Nonexistence of mixed-strategy NE): For a COG, there is no mixed strategy that
makes the players reach an NE.2
Proof: For a given k, let us fix players −k’s strategy probability distribution as π∗−k(x−k) ∈
∆(X−k). Regarding the utility u¯k of player k, we have
u¯k(πk, π
∗
−k) =
∫
X−k
∫ 1
0
uk(xk,x−k)πk(xk)π
∗
−k(x−k)dxkdx−k
=
∫
X−k
∫ 1
0
[
α log2
(
1 +
(1− xk)Pkck,k
n0α +
∑
j∈K\{k}(1− xj)Pjcj,k
)
+ βk log2
(
1 +
xkPkck,k
n0βk
)]
πk(xk)π
∗
−k(x−k)dxkdx−k
(a)
≤
∫
X−k
[
α log2
(
1 +
∫ 1
0
(1− xk)Pkck,kπk(xk)dxk
n0α +
∑
j∈K\{k}(1− xj)Pjcj,k
)
+ βk log2
(
1 +
∫ 1
0
xkPkck,kπk(xk)dxk
n0βk
)]
π∗−k(x−k)dx−k
=
∫
X−k
[
α log2
(
1 +
(1− E[xk])Pkck,k
n0α +
∑
j∈K\{k}(1− xj)Pjcj,k
)
+ βk log2
(
1 +
E[xk]Pkck,k
n0βk
)]
π∗−k(x−k)dx−k,
where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality. Since uk(x) is strictly concave in xk (cf. proof of
Theorem 1), we achieve equality in (a) if and only if xk = E[xk] with probability 1, which
2Pure strategies are degenerated mixed strategies, and are excluded from the consideration.
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7means that player k’s strategy set is deterministic. So it is optimal for player k to adopt a pure
strategy to maximize its utility, and the same conclusion also applies to every other player. Thus
we rule out the possibility for mixed strategies being optimal and complete the proof.
According to Theorem 2, in the following we only need to focus on pure strategies.
C. Best-response Functions
Since uk(x) is strictly concave in xk, player k may choose a pure strategy xk ∈ [0, 1] satisfying
∂uk(xk,x−k)
∂xk
= 0, (2)
to maximize its utility when its opponent players adopt strategy x−k. Solving (2), we get
xk , fk(x−k) =
βk
α + βk
[
1 +
∑
j∈K\{k} Pjcj,k(1− xj)
Pkck,k
]
. (3)
Taking into account that xk is no greater than one, we obtain the best-response function BRk of
player k as
xk , BRk(x−k)
= min
{
βk
α + βk
[
1 +
∑
j∈K\{k} Pjcj,k(1− xj)
Pkck,k
]
, 1
}
. (4)
We can determine the NEs of a COG by solving the equations
xk = BRk(x−k), for k = 1, · · · , K. (5)
Note that the equations may have multiple solutions, corresponding to multiple NEs, as illustrated
in the next subsection.
D. Characterization of NEs for Two-player COGs
When a COG has only two players, it is convenient to describe the relationship between the
number and behavior of NEs and network parameters. The two players’ best-response functions
are:
x1 = BR1(x2) = min
{
β1
α + β1
[
1 +
P2c2,1
P1c1,1
(1− x2)
]
, 1
}
, (6)
x2 = BR2(x1) = min
{
β2
α + β2
[
1 +
P1c1,2
P2c2,2
(1− x1)
]
, 1
}
. (7)
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8When we draw both players’ best-response functions in the same (x1, x2)-coordinate diagram,
by the definition of NE, the intersection points of the two best-response functions correspond to
the NEs of the COG. Depending upon the network parameters, the number and locations of the
NEs vary, as illustrated in Figures 3-7. The behavior of NEs can be summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3: For a two-player COG, it has
1) a unique NE as the solution of
x1 =
β1
α+ β1
[
1 +
P2c2,1
P1c1,1
(1− x2)
]
,
x2 =
β2
α+ β2
[
1 +
P1c1,2
P2c2,2
(1− x1)
]
,
when the network parameters satisfy (see Figure 3)
c1,2
c2,2
<
P2
P1
α + β1
β2
and
c2,1
c1,1
<
P1
P2
α + β2
β1
; (8)
2) a unique NE as (x1, x2) =
(
β1
α+β1
, 1
)
, when (see Figure 4)
c1,2
c2,2
≥
P2
P1
α + β1
β2
and
c2,1
c1,1
<
P1
P2
α + β2
β1
; (9)
3) a unique NE as (x1, x2) =
(
1, β2
α+β2
)
, when (see Figure 4)
c1,2
c2,2
<
P2
P1
α + β1
β2
and
c2,1
c1,1
≥
P1
P2
α + β2
β1
; (10)
4) three NEs as those listed in cases 1)-3) above together, when (see Figure 5)
c1,2
c2,2
>
P2
P1
α + β1
β2
and
c2,1
c1,1
>
P1
P2
α + β2
β1
. (11)
For this case, there are two singular subcases. If any one of the two inequalities becomes
equality, the three NEs collapse into two, since the NE in case 1) coincides with the NE
in case 2) or 3); see Figure 6. If both of the two inequalities become equal, there are an
infinite number of NEs since the two lines
x1 =
β1
α+ β1
[
1 +
P2c2,1
P1c1,1
(1− x2)
]
,
x2 =
β2
α+ β2
[
1 +
P1c1,2
P2c2,2
(1− x1)
]
coincide for all x1 ∈
[
β2
α+β2
, 1
]
; see Figure 7.
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9Let us make a few comments regarding Theorem 3. Throughout its cases, we notice that the
behavior of NEs depends upon the comparison between two sets of quantities,
c1,2P1
α + β1
versus
c2,2P2
β2
, and c2,1P2
α + β2
versus
c1,1P1
β1
. (12)
In the first comparison, c1,2P1/(α + β1) can be viewed as the interference strength to player
2, when player 1 evenly distributes its power across its private band and the shared band, and
c2,2P2/β2 can be viewed as the signal strength to player 2 when it exclusively uses its private
band. The two quantities in the second comparison can also be interpreted correspondingly. It
is interesting that the comparison between these seemingly unrelated quantities determines the
behavior of NEs in the game.
The NE in case 1) implies that both players allocate a portion of their power budgets to the
shared band, so that they indeed coexist tolerating a certain amount of interference. According
to (8), this occurs when the interference strengths to both players are weak. The NE in case 2)
or 3),
(
β1
α+β1
, 1
)
or
(
1, β2
α+β2
)
, implies that player 2 or player 1 completely retreats from the
shared band, while the other player evenly distributes its power across its private band and the
shared band. This is the unique stable operating point (i.e., NE) when one player experiences
strong interference while the other’s interference is still weak. In case 4), the interference
strengths to both players are strong, and it is interesting that then the system may reach any of
three equilibrium operating points: players coexisting within the shared band, and either player
completely retreating from the shared band.
IV. BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS FOR DISTRIBUTED LEARNING
Having established the existence of NEs in COGs, in this section, we focus on the behavior
of best-response dynamics for distributed learning, to examine whether the dynamics’ evolution
eventually leads all players to reach an NE. We begin with defining the best-response dynamic
learning procedures. We then fully characterize the convergence properties of best-response
dynamics for two-player COGs. Finally for K-player COGs, we establish the convergence
properties of best-response dynamics, when the network parameters are such that the resulting
best-response functions are all linear.
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A. Best-response dynamics
We assume that in a best-response dynamic process, whenever a player k decides to update
its strategy at time instant t, it possesses the knowledge of the other players’ joint strategies x−k
at t, and the updating rule is
xk(t
+) = BRk(x−k(t)). (13)
That is, the updated strategy xk right after the time instant t is the one that maximizes the utility
uk given the strategies of the other players at t. Inspecting the best-response functions (4), we
note that in order to update xk, it is only necessary for WSP k’s receiver to measure the level
of aggregated interference in the shared band,
∑
j∈K\{k} Pjcj,k(1 − xj). Furthermore, we may
rewrite (4) as
xk = min
{
βk
α + βk
[
1 +
1− xk
SIRk
]
, 1
}
, (14)
where
SIRk ,
Pkck,k(1− xk)∑
j∈K\{k} Pjcj,k(1− xj)
(15)
denotes the signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) of WSP k’s receiver in the shared band.
In the following, we consider two situations. In the first situation, all the players update their
strategies simultaneously. We call this simultaneous-move best-response dynamic (SMBRD). In
the second situation, the players update their strategies sequentially, in a periodic round robin
fashion. We call this alternating-move best-response dynamic (AMBRD).
For the two kinds of best-response dynamics, we propose the following distributed learning
algorithms. In the algorithm description, we assume for simplicity that time is slotted and updates
occur at the beginning of each time slot.
Simultaneous-Move Best-Response Dynamic (SMBRD):
For each player k ∈ K:
Step 1: At time t = 0, player k selects an initial strategy xk(0) arbitrarily within [0, 1];
Step 2: At time t + 1, given the measurement of SIRk(t), player k updates its strategy to
xk(t+ 1) = min
{
βk
α+βk
[
1 + 1
SIRk(t)
]
, 1
}
;
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Step 3: Increase the time slot index to t + 1 and go back to step 2 until all the players’
strategies become stationary or the time index reaches the prescribed maximum number
of iterations.
Alternating-Move Best-Response Dynamic (AMBRD):
Without loss of generality, we assume that the K players update their strategies sequentially and
periodically, from player 1 until player K in each updating cycle.
Step 1: At time t = 0, player 1 selects an initial strategy x1(0) arbitrarily within [0, 1];
Step 2: For each player k = 2, · · · , K, it takes turns to revise its strategy at time t+ k − 1.
Given the measurement of SIRk(t+k−1), player k updates its strategy to xk(t+k) =
min
{
βk
α+βk
[
1 + 1
SIRk(t+k−1)
]
, 1
}
;
Step 3: Increase the time index to t + K, and player 1 updates its strategy according to
x1(t+K) = min
{
β1
α+β1
[
1 + 1
SIR1(t+K−1)
]
, 1
}
. Go back to step 2 until all the players’
strategies become stationary or the time index reaches the prescribed maximum number
of iterations.
B. Convergence Analysis for Two-player COGs
In this subsection, we analyze the simple case where there are only two players in the COG. Let
us begin with the SMBRD, whose execution exhibits a sequence of strategies of the two players.
From the best-response functions of the two players, we see that the sequence of strategies can
be decomposed into the following two subsequences
Sequence[a] : (x1(0), x2(1)) , (x1(2), x2(3)) , · · · ,
and Sequence[b] : (x2(0), x1(1)) , (x2(2), x1(3)) , · · · ,
each of which evolves independently of the other. Sequence[a] is uniquely determined by
player 1’s initial strategy x1(0), and Sequence[b] by x2(0). So we can study each sequence’s
convergence property individually. Only when these two subsequences’ limits coincide, the
SMBRD converges; otherwise the SMBRD exhibits a cycling behavior between the limits of
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the two subsequences. In the following discussion, for notational simplicity, we abbreviate (3)
as xk = fk(x−k) = −bkx−k + ak, where ak, bk > 0 for k = 1, 2, and denote the intersection of
the two lines by (x∗1, x∗2). We then discuss the convergence property of the two sequences under
difference network parameters.
1) When the COG only has a unique NE:
a) When condition:
c1,2
c2,2
<
P2
P1
α + β1
β2
and
c2,1
c1,1
<
P1
P2
α + β2
β1
(16)
is satisfied, the unique NE is (x∗1, x∗2), the solution of xk = −bkx−k + ak (k = 1, 2);
see Figure 3. By symmetry we only discuss Sequence[a]’s convergence property and
the discussion for Sequence[b] is similar. From the conditions (16), if x1(t) > f−12 (1),
we have
x1(t+ 2)− x
∗
1 = b1b2[x1(t)− x
∗
1], (17)
in which 0 < b1b2 < 1. So the updating process of x1(t) will converge to x∗1. If
x1(t) < f
−1
2 (1), then we have x2(t + 1) = 1, x1(t + 2) = f1(1) > f−12 (1), which
again enters the regime of (17) and thus x1(t) will converge to x∗1 and x2(t) will
converge to BR2(x∗1) = x∗2. The analysis of Sequence[b] yields the same result, and
we therefore see that under (16), both Sequence[a] and Sequence[b] converge to the
unique NE.
b) when condition:
c1,2
c2,2
≥
P2
P1
α + β1
β2
and
c2,1
c1,1
<
P1
P2
α+ β2
β1
(18)
is satisfied (cf. Figure 4), similar to the discussion above, we can verify that both
Sequence[a] and Sequence[b] converge to the NE (f1(1), 1) given any initial strategies
(x1(0), x2(0)). For the other symmetric case, both sequences will converge to the NE
(1, f2(1)).
Therefore, when the COG has only one NE, SMBRD will always converge to the NE.
2) When the COG has two NEs, by symmetry we only discuss the case where conditions
c1,2
c2,2
>
P2
P1
α+ β1
β2
and
c2,1
c1,1
=
P1
P2
α + β2
β1
(19)
are satisfied (cf. Figure 6). Note that with the conditions, b1b2 > 1. Similar to the discussion
above, we see that when x1(0) < 1, Sequence[a] converges to (f1(1), 1), but when x1(0) =
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1, Sequence[a] converges to (1, f2(1)). For Sequence[b], when x2(0) ≤ f2(1), we have
x1(1) = 1 and x2(2) = f2(1), and then Sequence[b] converges to (1, f2(1)); when x2(0) >
f2(1), due to b1b2 > 1 and
x2(t+ 2)− x
∗
2 = b1b2[x2(t)− x
∗
2], (20)
Sequence[b] converges to (f1(1), 1). Therefore, under the conditions (19), when the initial
strategies x(0) fall within region I in Figure 6, SMBRD converges to the NE (f1(1), 1),
and when the initial strategies x(0) fall within region II, SMBRD ends up with cycling
between strategies (f1(1), f2(1)) and (1, 1).
3) When the COG has three NEs, the conditions
c1,2
c2,2
>
P2
P1
α+ β1
β2
and
c2,1
c1,1
>
P1
P2
α + β2
β1
(21)
are satisfied (cf. Figure 5). We trace the evolution of the sequences and get the following
result. For Sequence[a], when the initial strategy satisfies x1(0) < x∗1, it converges to the
NE (f1(1), 1), otherwise it converges to another NE (1, f2(1)). For Sequence[b], when
the initial strategy satisfies x2(0) < x∗2, it converges to the NE (1, f2(1)), otherwise it
converges to another NE (f1(1), 1). Therefore, under the conditions (21), when the initial
strategies x(0) fall within region I in Figure 5, SMBRD converges to the NE (f1(1), 1),
when the initial strategies x(0) fall within region II or III, SMBRD ends up with cycling
between strategies (f1(1), f2(1)) and (1, 1), and when the initial strategies x(0) fall within
region IV, SMBRD converges to the NE (1, f2(1)).
4) When the COG has an infinite number of NEs, the conditions
c1,2
c2,2
=
P2
P1
α+ β1
β2
and
c2,1
c1,1
=
P1
P2
α + β2
β1
(22)
are satisfied (cf. Figure 7). For Sequence[a], when the initial strategy satisfies x1(0) <
f1(1), it converges to the NE (f1(1), 1), otherwise it converges to the NE (x1(0), f2(x1(0)));
for Sequence[b], when the initial strategy satisfies x2(0) < f2(1), it converges to the NE
(f1(x2(0)), x2(0)), otherwise it converges to NE (1, f1(1)). Therefore, under the conditions
(22), when the initial strategies x(0) fall within region I in Figure 7, SMBRD ends up
with cycling between strategies (f1(1), x2(0)) and (f1(x2(0)), 1), when x(0) falls within
region II, SMBRD ends up with cycling between strategies (f1(x2(0)), f2(x1(0))) and
(x1(0), x2(0)), when x(0) falls within region III, SMBRD ends up with cycling between
November 5, 2018 DRAFT
14
strategies (f1(1), f2(1)) and (1, 1), and when x(0) falls within region IV, SMBRD ends
up with cycling between strategies (x1(0), f2(1)) and (1, f2(x1(0))).
Summarizing the discussion above for various conditions, we see that both Sequence[a] and
Sequence[b], which are respectively determined by the initial strategies x1(0) and x2(0), converge
to limiting strategies. However, under several conditions, the two sequences do not converge to
the same limiting strategies, and then SMBRD does not converge. On the other hand, because
an AMBRD corresponds to exactly one of the two sequences, the convergence of AMBRD is
guaranteed. So for two-player COGs we obtain the following theorem regarding the convergence
property of best-response dynamics.
Theorem 4 (Convergence of two-player dynamics): For a two-player COG, SMBRD is guar-
anteed to converge to an NE starting from an arbitrary x(0) if and only if the COG has only
one NE; in contrast, AMBRD always converges to an NE regardless of the number of NEs in
the COG.
The fact that AMBRD always converges for any initial joint strategies is desirable from an
engineering perspective. It guarantees that a distributed network protocol designed based on
AMBRD does terminate after a sufficient number of updates, avoiding the so-called “ping-pong
effect”.
C. Convergence Analysis for K-player COGs with Linear Best-responses
The analysis of the convergence property, when it comes to more general case in which a
COG consists of K > 2 players, becomes difficult due to the lack of convenient properties
such as potential games3 or supermodular games.4 In the following, we analyze the convergence
property of K-player COGs which admit linear best-response functions.
The best-response function (4) implies that player k will allocate all its power to its private
band when the aggregated interference from other players in the shared band exceeds a threshold.
When the interference is not too strong, the best-response functions become linear without
3The COG is not an exact potential game except for very special choices of network parameters, since in general we have
∂2ui
∂xi∂xj
6=
∂2uj
∂xi∂xj
, i 6= j [13], and we were unsuccessful in verifying whether it is an ordinal potential game.
4Only for two-player COGs it is possible to convert the COGs into supermodular games [8], and in general COGs are not
supermodular since ∂
2ui
∂xi∂xj
> 0 does not always hold for all xi, xj .
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saturation. This occurs if
βk
α + βk
[
1 +
∑
j∈K\{k} Pjcj,k(1− xj)
Pkck,k
]
< 1 (23)
holds for each player k ∈ K. To ensure that the best-response functions are linear given any
initial strategies throughout the execution of best-response dynamics, we need (23) to hold for
any xk ∈ [0, 1], k ∈ K. This consideration hence leads to the conditions∑
j∈K\{k}
Pjcj,k <
α
βk
Pkck,k, ∀k ∈ K. (24)
We first establish that under conditions (24) a COG has a unique NE.
Theorem 5: For a K-player COG satisfying (24), it has a unique NE.
Proof: Under the assumption of (24), all the best-response functions are linear, and by
rearranging terms we see that the NEs of the COG should satisfy
x
∗ = Ax∗ + b, (25)
where A is a K ×K matrix in which A(k, j) = − βk
α+βk
Pjcj,k
Pkck,k
for j 6= k and A(k, k) = 0, and
b(k) = βk
α+βk
∑
j∈K Pjcj,k
Pkck,k
, for k = 1, . . . , K. From (24), we have
∑
j 6=k
|A(k, j)| =
βk
α+ βk
1
Pkck,k
∑
j 6=k
Pjcj,k
<
βk
α+ βk
1
Pkck,k
α
βk
Pkck,k
=
α
α+ βk
≤ 1, (26)
for all k = 1, . . . , K. Hence from Gershgorin’s circle theorem (see, e.g., [14]), the bound (26)
implies that the maximum eigenvalue of matrix A satisfies |λmax| < 1. Hence the matrix I −A
is nonsingular, so that the solution of x∗ = Ax∗ + b is unique, given by x∗ = (I −A)−1b with
x
∗ ∈ (0, 1)K due to Theorem 1.
The convergence of SMBRD is a direct convergence of Theorem 5.
Theorem 6: For a K-player COG satisfying (24), SMBRD is guaranteed to converge to the
unique NE.
Proof: The updating process of SMBRD can be written as the following iteration,
x(t + 1) = Ax(t) + b. (27)
November 5, 2018 DRAFT
16
From the proof of Theorem 5, we see that the iteration (27) is globally asymptotically stable
since all eigenvalues of matrix A satisfy |λk| < 1. So we conclude that under (24), SMBRD is
guaranteed to converge to the unique NE given by x∗ = (I − A)−1b.
Establishing the convergence of AMBRD is similar while a little more involved, as provided
by the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 7: For a K-player COG satisfying (24), AMBRD is guaranteed to converge to the
unique NE.
Proof: Under the assumption of (24), when player k updates its strategy, the updating
process of AMBRD can be written as
x(t+ 1) = Akx(t) + bk, (28)
where Ak is a K ×K unit diagonal matrix, except that its k-th row is replaced by the k-th row
of the matrix A. The elements of the length-K vector bk are all zero except that its k-th element
is the k-th element of b. So if we view a full updating cycle from player 1 to player K as a
whole, the updating iteration is like
x((i+ 1)K) =
1∏
k=K
Akx(iK) + b˜, i = 0, 1, . . . , (29)
where
b˜ =
2∏
k=K
Akb1 +
3∏
k=K
Akb2 + . . .+ AKbK−1 + bK . (30)
So in order to prove that the AMBRD converges, it suffices to establish that all the eigenvalues
of
∏1
k=K Ak satisfy |λk| < 1. For this, we again utilize Gershgorin’s circle theorem, showing
that the row norm of
∏1
k=K Ak is smaller than one.
Denote the k-th row elements of Ak by [ak,1, ak,2, . . . , ak,K ], in which ak,k = 0 and ak,j =
A(k, j) = − βk
α+βk
Pjcj,k
Pkck,k
for j 6= k. Let us trace the calculation of
∏1
k=K Ak to check that all
of its absolute row sums are smaller than one. For this, we show by induction the following
claim: each of the first l rows of A(l) =
∏1
k=lAk has its absolute sum smaller than one, for
l = 1, . . . , K.
For l = 1, the claim apparently holds. For l = 2, A(2) = A2A1. Its first row remains
[a1,1, a1,2, . . . , a1,K ], whose absolute row sum is smaller than one, by the assumption of (24). Its
second row is
[a2,1a1,1, (a2,1a1,2 + a2,2), (a2,1a1,3 + a2,3), . . . , (a2,1a1,K + a2,K)] ,
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whose absolute row sum is
|a2,1a1,1|+
K∑
j=2
|a2,1a1,j + a2,j | ≤ |a2,1|
K∑
j=1
|a1,j|+
K∑
j=2
|a2,j|
< |a2,1| · 1 +
K∑
j=2
|a2,j| =
K∑
j=1
|a2,j| < 1.
So the claim holds for l = 2. Now assume that the claim holds up till l, and examine A(l+1).
For notational simplicity we denote the i-th row elements of A(l) by [a(l)i,1, a
(l)
i,2, . . . , a
(l)
i,K ]. Since
A(l+1) = Al+1A
(l)
, we see that its first l rows remain those of A(l), thus satisfying their absolute
row sums smaller than one by assumption. For its (l + 1)-th row, the first l elements are
a
(l+1)
l+1,j = al+1,1a
(l)
1,j + al+1,2a
(l)
2,j + . . .+ al+1,la
(l)
l,j , j = 1, . . . , l,
and the last K − l elements are
a
(l+1)
l+1,j = al+1,1a
(l)
1,j + al+1,2a
(l)
2,j + . . .+ al+1,la
(l)
l,j + al+1,j , j = l + 1, . . . , K.
So we have
K∑
j=1
∣∣∣a(l+1)l+1,j ∣∣∣ ≤ l∑
i=1
|al+1,i|
K∑
j=1
∣∣∣a(l)i,j∣∣∣+ K∑
j=l+1
|al+1,j|
<
l∑
i=1
|al+1,i|+
K∑
j=l+1
|al+1,j| < 1,
where the first inequality is from |x+y| ≤ |x|+ |y|, the second inequality is from the assumption
of induction for A(l), and the third inequality is from the assumption for Al+1. As we let l increase
from 1 to K−1, we establish the claim that each of the rows of A(K) =
∏1
k=K Ak has its absolute
sum smaller than one, and thus Gershgorin’s circle theorem guarantees that all the eigenvalues
of
∏1
k=K Ak satisfy |λk| < 1.
Consequently, the iteration (29) has a unique fixed point as
x
∗ =
(
I −
1∏
k=K
Ak
)−1
b˜, (31)
which, from the nature of AMBRD, is a NE of the underlying COG. On the other hand, Theorem
5 indicates that the NE is unique under (24). Therefore we see that the fixed point in (31) has
to coincide with the unique NE of the COG given in Theorem 5, i.e., x∗ = (I −A)−1b.
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V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we perform some numerical simulations to illustrate the analysis in Section
IV. First, We fix the spectrum allocation as α = 0.5, βk = 0.5/K, k = 1, . . . , K. The average
power budgets for all the WSPs are identical as Pk = 1, and the power spectral density of white
Gaussian noise is n0 = 10−2. We use Monte Carlo simulation, in which the initial joint strategies
are uniformly distributed in the entire product strategy space, to verify the relationship between
the network parameters and the best-response dynamics’ convergence property. In simulation,
we view an iteration as converged when either the condition
max
k∈K
{|xk(t+ 1)− xk(t)|} ≤ ǫ = 10
−2 (32)
is met for SMBRD, or the condition
max
k∈K
{|xk(t+ j)− xk(t+ j −K)|} ≤ ǫ = 10
−2, ∀j = 1, · · · , K (33)
is met for AMBRD. The maximum number of updates in an iteration is set as 100.
When a COG has only two players, the convergence property of SMBRD and AMBRD by sim-
ulations is depicted in Figure 8. We consider four sets of network parameters: (c1,2/c2,2, c2,1/c1,1) =
(0.4, 0.6), (3, 4), (3.5, 4), (3, 3), which correspond to four different cases: a COG having one NE,
two NEs, three NEs and an infinite number of NEs. We use empirical cumulative distribution
functions to characterize each best-response dynamic’s convergence property. From Figure 8, we
verify that AMBRD always converges to an NE for all cases, and that SMBRD only converges
when a COG has a unique NE. Nevertheless, when a COG has a unique NE, SMBRD converges
more quickly than AMBRD.
When a COG has four players, we perform a corresponding simulation, with the convergence
property depicted in Figure 9. We consider three different interference matrices:
C1 =


1 0.2 0.1 0.4
0.4 1 0.5 0.3
0.3 0.4 1 0.6
0.4 0.2 0.5 1

 , C2 =


1 0.6 1.4 1.6
1.4 1 0.9 1.4
2.3 1.4 1 2.0
0.9 0.7 1.4 1

 , C3 =


1 1.4 2.0 0.9
0.4 1 1.6 2.1
1.4 2.2 1 0.9
1.2 2.1 3.0 1

 .
They respectively correspond to weak interference (conditions (24) satisfied for all players),
medium interference (conditions (24) satisfied for all but one players), and strong interference
(conditions (24) unsatisfied for all players). From the simulation results, we verify the validity
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of the analysis in Section IV-C for the case of weak interference. Furthermore, we observe that
SMBRD and AMBRD may also converge to an NE even when the best-response functions are
nonlinear with saturation, although our analysis in Section IV is not able to ensure so. When the
interference is weak, SMBRD converges more quickly than AMBRD; whereas as the interference
becomes strong, AMBRD converges more quickly than SMBRD.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, motivated by the emerging use case of capacity offload, we considered the
interference management problem in which different WSPs allocate their transmission power
resources between their own private bands and a shared band which is simultaneously available
to all of the WSPs. Taking into account the non-cooperate relationship among the WSPs, we
formulated the problem into a non-cooperative game and analyzed its properties. We further
proposed two distributed learning dynamics for each WSP to individually learn from its local
measurement to reach an NE, and analyzed the convergence properties of the dynamics. A
number of topics may be explored for future research, including establishing the convergence
properties for general K-user COGs without linear best-responses, cooperative game-theoretic
formulations, and design of effective mechanisms for improved overall utilities for WSPs and
even spectrum allocators.
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(b) Spectrum allocation scheme
Fig. 1. An example of typical capacity offload scenarios
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(b) Transmission in the shared band
Fig. 2. Mathematical model of capacity offload
November 5, 2018 DRAFT
22
1 2( )BR x
2 1( )BR x
1
1
0
1x
2x
* *
1 2( , )x x
1
1
1
(1) , 1f
b
a b
æ ö
=ç ÷+è ø
2
2
2
1, (1)f
b
a b
æ ö
=ç ÷+è ø
( )12 (1), 1f -
( )111, (1)f -
?? ??
?? ??
Fig. 3. Case 1) of Theorem 3. The network parameters satisfy f−12 (1) < f1(1) and f−11 (1) < f2(1), and thus the two
best-response functions intersect at only one point as indicated by (x∗1, x∗2), corresponding to the unique NE in the COG.
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Fig. 4. Cases 2) and 3) of Theorem 3. Here we depict the situation for case 2) only, and that for case 3) is similar. The
network parameters satisfy f−12 (1) ≥ f1(1) and f
−1
1 (1) < f2(1), and thus the two best-response functions intersect only at(
f1(1) =
β1
α+β1
, 1
)
.
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Fig. 5. Case 4) of Theorem 3. The network parameters satisfy f−12 (1) > f1(1) and f−11 (1) > f2(1), and thus the two
best-response functions intersect at three points, as indicated in the figure.
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Fig. 6. The special subcase with two NEs of case 4). The network parameters satisfy f−12 (1) > f1(1) and f−11 (1) = f2(1),
and thus the intersecting point (x∗1, x∗2) in Figure 5 coincides with
(
1, f2(1) =
β2
α+β2
)
. The other possibility f−12 (1) = f1(1)
and f−11 (1) > f2(1) is similar and thus omitted for conciseness.
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Fig. 7. The special subcase with an infinite number of NEs of case 4). The network parameters satisfy f−12 (1) = f1(1) and
f−11 (1) = f2(1), and thus the two slope segments of the best-response functions completely coincide, leading to an infinite
number of NEs.
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Fig. 8. Convergence property of two-player COGs
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